"Gentlemen, that
was as fine an example of discipline and training as I
have ever witnessed."
-- General MacArthur, September 5,
1943 [107]
Success of the
7th Australian Division's attack on the port city of Lae
depended on the possession of the airstrip at Nadzab to
allow the division to air-land. Before the war,
transport and small passenger aircraft used the airstrip for
emergency landings. Just to the south on the Markham
River was the Gabmatzung Mission, run by the German
Lutherans. From Gabmatzung, the Markham Road ran
twenty-five miles southeast to the port city of Lae, New
Guinea. Nadzab was important not only for the
airstrip, but also its location along the Markham River
Valley to the west of the Huon Peninsula. The Markham
and Ramu Rivers were the two major waterways on the island
of New Guinea. The Markham ran southeast to the Huon
Gulf at Lae, and the Ramu ran northwest to the Hansa Bay
between Wewak and Madang. These two rivers formed a
valley that separated the Huon Peninsula from the remainder
of New Guinea. The valley made an easy passage to the
Japanese bases of Wewak and Madang along the northern coast
of New Guinea (see figs. 5 and 7). Capturing this key
terrain at Nadzab would block that valley route, while
possession of the airstrip would give the Fifth Air Force
another forward base to support its air campaign against
Rabaul and Wewak.[108]
On August 24,
both MacArthur and Kenney arrived at Port Moresby to be
present for the final stages of the planning and for the
execution of the operation. Several days after
MacArthur's arrival, he surprised Vasey with a trip to his
headquarters. The two seemed to get along well
together and agreed on the concept and details of the
operation. Their only disagreement was over Japanese
troop strength at Lae. Vasey placed the number at
close to 5,000, while Herring's staff put it at nearly
7,000. MacArthur thought it was much smaller, around
1,400. While the actual strength was about 2,000,
MacArthur had the advantage of having information gained
through signal intelligence available to only the very
senior commanders.[109]
The 7th
Australian Division published its operations order on August
27. The intent of the operation was to secure Nadzab
in order to conduct offensive operations against Lae and to
prevent the Japanese from sending reinforcements up the
Markham Valley.[110]
The tasks given to
the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment were as
follows:
(a)
Capture area
Nadzab - Gabmatsung - Gabsonkek on Z-Day -- object
covering preparation of a landing
strip.
(b)
Establish road
block across Markham Valley Rd. in area of junc. Rd and
track 445546 -- object preventing enemy movement into
Nadzab along this road.
(c)
Prepare landing strip on site of
present Nadzab emergency landing field with utmost
speed.[111]
MacArthur had not
established the date for the operation when the 7th
Australian Division published its order. The final
date did not come until September 1 when Kenney made his
recommendation to MacArthur based on the weather
forecasts. Z-Day was one day after the 9th Australian
Division's amphibious assault to the east of
Lae.
On August 29,
one week before the operation, Kinsler assembled his three
battalion commanders and staff at his regimental
headquarters to brief them on the mission to drop on, seize
and hold the abandoned airstrip at Nadzab. They would
link-up with Australian engineers who would upgrade the
strip to permit the landing of the 7th Australian
Division. The division would then attack Lae from the
west while the 503d PIR continued to secure the Nadzab
airstrip.[112]
Kinsler
assigned Britten the task of jumping his First Battalion
directly onto the airstrip and clearing it of all enemy
troops, although the intelligence reports indicated that
there were very few in the area. In addition, the
battalion was responsible for starting the preparation of
the airstrip until relieved by the Australian
engineers. Next Kinsler directed Jones to jump his
Second Battalion north of the airstrip to secure Gabsonkek
and provide flank protection for First Battalion.
Last, he assigned Tolson's Third Battalion to jump east of
the airstrip and the secure the village of Gabmatzung.
This was the enemy's most likely avenue of approach if the
Japanese opposed the landing from the garrison at Lae.
This was not likely, however, because the Japanese units at
Lae would have their hands full defending against the 9th
Australian Division attacking them from the
east.[113]
The 503d PIR
did not have any attached or organic artillery. To
make up for the shortage of firepower, MacArthur's
headquarters provided two "cut-down" twenty-five pound
artillery sections with thirty-one personnel from the
Australian 2/4th Field Regiment. The only problem was
that the Australian gunners had never seen parachutes.
Lieutenant Robert W. Armstrong, from First Battalion, had
the responsibility of training the volunteers in the basic
skills of jumping from an aircraft. The gunners also
learned how to disassemble the artillery pieces and pack
them in separate containers, each attached to the other with
webbing (known as the ground control pattern) in order to
facilitate recovery and expedite assembly on the
ground. This was essentially the same procedure used
for dropping the American 75mm pack
howitzer.[114]
On August 30,
the gunners made their one and only practice jump with one
of their guns under the watchful eyes of Vasey and their
regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Blyth.
It was such a success, that they earned the right to go in
with the 503d PIR on its first combat jump. The
Aussies were not actually going to jump with the regiment,
but they would do so one hour after the initial airborne
operation. Four airplanes arrived at Port Moresby on
September 4 to transport the Australian gunners and "baby 25
pounders." They loaded their guns and flew the same
day to Tsili-Tsili in preparation for the next day's
jump.[115]
Kinsler, his
three battalion commanders, and several regimental staff
officers made a reconnaissance flight over the jump area in
a B-17 on August 30. This flight proved valuable
because they were able to view the proposed jump areas,
check points and surrounding areas. Even more
importantly, they were able to determine the prevailing
winds near the jump areas. The meteorological reports
stated that winds in the Markham Valley were unusual:
they blew down the valley until 1100 hours daily and then
suddenly changed and blew up the valley. This proved
to be exactly the case.[116]
On September
1, Kinsler met with all the company commanders in the
regiment. He gave them an overview of the upcoming
mission, but wanted it kept a secret from the
paratroopers. The men may have not have known the
details, but they saw the officers coming and going to
secret meetings as well as the continuous arrival of C-47s,
so they knew something important was about to happen.
Meanwhile, they conducted intense rehearsals and training
for the upcoming mission, attending classes on Japanese
weapons, friendly aircraft identification, demolitions
methods, and land navigation.[117] Of course, there were also the
occasional visitors who wanted to see the 503d PIR.
Vasey showed up to address the regiment and tell the
paratroopers how proud he was to have them with him.
They were struck by the bitter way he referred to "Dirty
Little Nips" in his "kill them all"
speech.[118] Another visitor was MacArthur,
who arrived with his corps of photographers and had his
picture taken with many members of the
regiment.[119]
The Fifth Air
Force airmen also conducted extensive preparations before
the operation for their part. The 54th Troop Carrier
Wing, under the command of Colonel Paul H. Prentiss, was
responsible for airlifting the men to the target.
After much planning and preparation between the Fifth Air
Force and the 503d PIR staffs, they decided to use a
formation of six planes staggered to the right with thirty
seconds between elements in order to reduce chance of
mid-air collisions while maximizing the widths of the drop
zones.[120]
General Kenney
was concerned about the vulnerability of the troop carrier
convoy along the route to Nadzab, so he and Whitehead
developed a very intricate air support plan for the
operation. The Fifth Fighter Command was responsible
for furnishing fighter protection along the way, as well as
smoke and air support before, during and after the parachute
operation. The air plan had 100 fighter aircraft to
protect the slow-moving and bunched up transports. The
air plan also had six squadrons of B-25s to strafe and bomb
the jump areas before the airborne operation. Just
after the B-25s, six A-20s would lay smoke across the jump
areas to screen the descending paratroopers. Kenney
did not want to leave anything to chance.[121]
The Fifth Air
Force practiced the entire mission for three straight days
starting on September 2. The pilots were veterans and
knew all the details of the three major jump areas -- one
for each battalion. Emphasis during rehearsals was on
formation flying to ensure that the entire 503d PIR landed
accurately and together so that it could quickly assemble
and seize its assault objectives. The Fifth even
conducted a full-scale trial run over Rorona, an abandoned
airstrip thirty miles up the coast from Port Moresby.
The fighter protection fired before the troop carriers
loaded with the entire 503d PIR flew over the abandoned
airstrip and some of the paratroopers jumped to check the
timing. The staffs corrected a few minor details and
everyone felt much more comfortable about the
mission.[122]
On September
3, Kinsler and the 503d PIR staff issued Field Order
1. The four page base order described the plan for the
two-phase operation. The first phase was for the
regiment to jump on six separate drop zones in order to
seize the emergency landing strip at Nadzab (see fig.
8). In addition, the regiment would secure the
surrounding areas to deny any enemy infiltration (see fig.
9). The second phase was to receive the 7th Australian
Division beginning the following day (see fig.
10).[123]
The order
contained no changes from Kinsler’s briefing to his
battalion commanders on August 29 or his company commanders
on September 1, but simply added many details. First
Battalion had the task of jumping onto Field “B” to capture
and begin preparing the Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip until
relieved. Second Battalion’s mission was to jump on
Field "A" to capture the Gabonek area and deny enemy
infiltration from the north and northwest. Meanwhile,
Third Battalion was to jump onto Field “C” to capture the
Gabmatzung area and deny enemy infiltration from the
east. The Regimental Headquarters Company would
assemble with First Battalion and prepare the drop zone for
the Australian artillery battery. Regimental Service
Company would also assemble with First Battalion and gather
and distribute equipment and supplies.[124]
The regiment spent the remainder of the day completing
battalion orders and conducting rehearsals, as well as
preparing the company orders. The battalion commanders
had the officers around their sand tables one company at a
time going over their missions. It was not until
September 4, the day before the jump, that company
commanders assembled their men and spelled out in detail
their missions. All day long, a platoon at a
time gathered at the regimental sand table where each
soldier received a briefing on his mission. The
jumpmasters held the last meeting that night. The
leaders reviewed the whole mission and updated everyone on
the latest changes.[125]
While the 503d PIR made its final preparations on September
4, the 9th Australian Division landed
twenty miles east of Lae against very light
opposition. Several Japanese bombers were able to get
through and attack the congested beaches. The bombers
were able to damage two ships and kill more than one hundred
Australian and American seamen. All through the night,
as the members of the 503d PIR tried to sleep, the 9th
Australian Division continued to march on
Lae.[126]
Reveille was at 0300 hours on Sunday, September 5. The
paratroopers rapidly assembled in their battalion areas and
nervously ate the usual soggy pancakes covered with
syrup. As they loaded on the eighty-two trucks in the
regimental area, the weather suddenly turned and fog
completely enveloped the departure airfield. To make
matters worse, a light rain began. It did not look
like a good day for a jump.[127] The movement to the two airstrips,
Ward and Jackson, went like clockwork. Each truck,
numbered from one to eighty-two, corresponded to the same
numbered aircraft lined up on the field. The trucks
were in three serials – one for each battalion. The
first serial moved to the enplaning point and the other two
followed at thirty-minute intervals. Each truck, with
twenty-two personnel and supply bundles, proceeded to the
airplane marked with its corresponding
number.[128]
At about 0730 hours, the rain suddenly stopped and the fog
rapidly dissipated. A weather plane surveying the
saddle of the Owen Stanley Mountain range gave an all-clear
signal. The aircrews of the C-47s began warming up
their engines and the paratroopers started putting on their
parachutes and equipment. At 0825, the first C-47
rolled down the runway. Within fifteen minutes, three
flights of C-47s with the entire 503d PIR were in the air on
its way to Nadzab. The formation started for the jump
areas led by MacArthur in a B-17.[129]
Several days before the operation, Kenney had discussed with
MacArthur the details for covering and supporting the Nadzab
operation. Kenney casually mentioned that he would be
in one of the bombers during the airborne operation to see
how things were going. MacArthur said that he did not
think that Kenney should go. Kenney responded with a
series of reasons why he should go, concluding with "they
were my kids and I was going to see them do their
stuff." MacArthur reflected a moment. "You're
right, George, we'll both go,” he said. “They're my
kids, too."[130]
Kenney arranged for the "brass hat" flight of three B-17s to
fly just above and to one side of the troop carriers as they
went into Nadzab. In the first plane was MacArthur, in
the second was Kenney and Vasey rode in the third.
MacArthur's only concern was that his stomach might get
upset when they hit the rough air going over the mountains.
He did not want to "get sick and disgrace himself in front
of the kids."[131]
The armada of over 300 aircraft climbed to 9,000 feet to
cross over the saddle of Owen Stanley Mountains. The
temperature dipped, but not for long. The formation
dropped to 3,500 feet as it approached the secret airfield
at Marilinan. The armada rearranged the flight into
three columns, each six airplanes wide. Thirty minutes
out from the jump areas, the crew chiefs and the jumpmasters
started opening the jump doors. Aboard one of the
airplanes, the sudden rush of wind caused the door to come
loose from its hinges and become lodged, blocking the exit –
and aborting the mission for the frustrated paratroopers on
board. This was the only airplane that had a problem
and was not able to drop its contingent.[132]
At the junction of the Watut and Markham Rivers, the troop
carriers made a right turn for Nadzab and dropped to an
altitude of 400 feet. The weather then became very hot
and humid at the low altitude. The maneuvers of the
airplanes and the bumpiness of the flight began to produce
some airsickness and paratroopers commenced to fill the
"honey buckets." By the time they reached Nadzab, they
were anxious for the green light.[133]
At 1009 hours, the red lights came on and the paratroopers
began to stand and make final preparations for the airborne
operation while the bombing and strafing began at the jump
fields. Six squadrons of B-25 strafers flew at 1,000
feet; each had eight .50-caliber machine guns in the nose
and sixty fragmentation bombs in each bomb bay.
Immediately behind them were the six A-20s that laid smoke
across the jump areas as the last fragmentation bombs
exploded. At 1022 hours, the green lights came on
across the C-47s. The jumpmasters pushed the door
bundles out of the airplanes, then they went out right
behind the bundles with twenty-one jumpers in rapid
succession. In four and a half minutes, the entire
regiment was on its way to the ground. The pilot's of
54th Troop Carrier Wing, for the first time in the war,
dropped a regiment of paratroopers with pinpoint accuracy on
its assigned jump areas.[134]
Above the drop, MacArthur watched the operation, thrilled at
the sight of the parachutes clustered neatly on the jump
areas. After landing back at Port Moresby, Kenney
recalled MacArthur’s jumping up and down like a kid.
"Gentlemen, that was as fine an example of discipline and
training as I have ever witnessed,"[135] the supreme commander
exclaimed. Reflecting later on the operation, he took
keen pride in the precision drops. "One plane
after another poured out its stream of dropping men over the
target field. Everything went like clockwork . . . .
[T]he vertical envelopment became a
reality,"[136] he wrote of that day. To his
astonishment, he received the Air Medal for having
“personally led” the paratroopers and “skillfully directed”
the operation.[137]
Kenney sent a letter to the Chief of the Army Air Force
General H. H. Arnold describing the operation and his pride
in his airmen (see Appendix A). He also thought
that everything had gone smoothly until he landed and talked
with the pilot of MacArthur's B-17. What Kenney did
not know was that during the operation an engine had failed
on Colonel Roger Ramey's B-17, and that Ramey had
recommended turning around. MacArthur, knowing that Kenney
would follow him back to Port Moresby, refused.
MacArthur insisted that he wanted to stay and see the
show. The dead engine was on the far side of Kenney's
bomber, so he did not know until after they had landed and
Ramey told him of the incident.[138]
The airborne operation went extremely well, but not without
tragic incident. Three paratroopers died during the
airborne operation, two falling to their deaths when their
parachutes malfunctioned and another landing atop a very
tall teakwood tree and then falling some sixty feet to the
ground. In addition to the three deaths, there were
thirty-three minor injuries caused by rough
landings.[139]
A small glitch also occurred with the jump by paratroopers
of Third Battalion. The first person to make the jump
at Nadzab was its commander, the 26-year-old Colonel Tolson,
who thus became the first American paratrooper to jump in a
combat operation in the Pacific. His battalion,
leading the regiment into Nadzab, had the mission of jumping
on Field "C" and blocking the enemy on the east. As
Tolson approached the drop zone, he recognized where he was
from several reconnaissance flights with the Fifth Air
Force's bomber runs on Lae. He watched the red light
go off, but then the navigator failed to turn on the green
light. Hesitating for a few seconds, Tolson still
jumped out and landed in the middle of the jump area.
Because of the delay, about half of Third Battalion landed
in the trees at the eastern end of the drop
zone.[140]
The remainder of the regiment dropped accurately, but the
paratroopers on the jump areas were no better off than those
who landed in the trees. The razor-sharp kunai grass,
supposedly only about four feet high, reached up to ten feet
high and was thick with jungle vines. The
paratroopers, in suffocating heat, hacked their way through
with machetes and reached their assembly areas
exhausted. That was the only fight for the 503d PIR --
there was no opposition on the ground. The
paratroopers had caught the Japanese totally by
surprise.[141] Even if the Japanese had been
at Nadzab, they probably would not have survived the
pre-assault fires from the Fifth Air Force. In Second
Battalion's area, a worn trail went from the jungle out onto
their jump area. The trail across the clearing was a
tribute to the Fifth Air Force. Every ten yards or so
there was a new bomb crater.[142]
There were also mishaps with the Australians. Within
two hours of the jump, all units had assembled, moved to
their assigned objectives and begun preparation of the
landing strip. Everything went basically according to
the plan. First Battalion seized the airstrip, Second
Battalion blocked all approaches from the north and Third
Battalion sealed all approaches from the
east.[143] One hour after the initial
assault, the thirty-one Australian gunners, led by their
trainer, Lieutenant Armstrong, jumped into Nadzab with their
two artillery pieces. The guns, disassembled and
packed in padded bundles under the wings of the C-47s,
dropped like parachute bombs on the drop
zone.[144] The whole group landed in a small
area, but took almost three hours to find the ammunition and
all the pieces to one gun and put it into operation.
It was not until the next day when they found all the pieces
to the second gun. The Australian gunners became the
first parachute artillery in the
Pacific.[145]
There was, moreover, a change in plans for resupply.
The original plan called for eleven gliders to come in
during the afternoon with supplies and equipment, but
because of the completely unopposed parachute operation,
immediate resupply proved unnecessary. Blamey also
canceled the glider phase because he had his doubts about
the reliability of the gliders and he knew that their pilots
had undergone only minimal training. The regiment did
not go without resupply, however, because three specially
configured B-17s loaded with supplies remained over the area
during daylight hours for the first two days of the
operation. The modified B-17s had a platform in the
bomb bay to drop parachute supply bundles.[146]
To assist the
503d PIR in preparing the airstrip at Nadzab, there were two
other Australian units -- the 2/6th Field Company and the
2/2nd Pioneer Battalion. The engineers and pioneers
arrived secretly at the Tsili-Tsili airstrip a week before
the operation. The units carefully disguised their
mission by occupying the surrounding jungle where the
Aussies assembled their equipment and began preparations for
movement to Nadzab. Tsili-Tsili was near the swift,
but barely navigable Watut River that ran northeast into the
Markham River about twenty-five miles upstream from
Nadzab.[147] The engineers from 2/6th Field
Company had the task of moving down the Watut and then down
the Markham River to Nadzab on twelve large collapsible
boats with all their heavy gear necessary for preparing the
airstrip at Nadzab. The task was very dangerous
because both of the rivers had rapids and constantly
changing sandbars. The engineers planned for a
possible 50 percent casualty rate, in men and equipment, but
lost only three boats and one man who drowned. They
arrived at their rendezvous point just south of Nadzab early
in the morning of September 4.[148]
The pioneers
from 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion had the difficult task of
moving sixty miles overland with a train of 800
natives. They crossed mountains and swamps, as well as
dealt with many of the jungle annoyances such as heat and
bees. On the morning of September 5, the pioneers
arrived at the south side of the Markham River across from
Nadzab and linked up with the engineers right on
schedule. The pioneers constructed a bridge from the
engineer's collapsible boats. Both units were able to
watch the show as hundreds of aircraft and many more
parachutes filled the skies overhead. They witnessed
the greatest aerial caravan ever seen in the
Pacific.[149]
At 1800 hours, the engineers and pioneers linked up with
First Battalion and began clearing the landing strip, which
was 1,500 feet, but overgrown from twelve months of
inactivity. Working throughout the night, they
extended the runway to 3,300 feet by the next morning.
The first C-47 landed at Nadzab at 10:00 AM on September 6
-- less than 24 hours after the jump.[150] By September 11, Prentiss'
C-47s had carried in 420 planeloads of men and equipment
from the 7th Australian Division.[151]
The 7th Australian Division pushed down the Markham Valley
to attack the Japanese at Lae from the west while the 9th
Australian Division pressed the attack from the east.
With the growing pressure on Lae, the reinforcements to
Salamaua ended. The 5th Australian Division and the
American 41st Division occupied Salamaua on September
13. Three days later, the 7th and 9th Australian
Divisions converged on Lae. Around noon, September 16,
Vasey sent a radio message to Kenney: "Only the Fifth
Air Force bombers are preventing me from entering
Lae."[152] Vasey and his 7th Australian
Division were the first to enter Lae and win the
bet.
Based on MacArthur's guidance, the 503d
PIR stayed near Nadzab with a defensive mission around
the captured airstrip. Vasey did not employ the 503d
PIR in offensive operations because MacArthur did not want
parachute troops doing what regular infantry troops could
do. MacArthur directed that after relief by
supporting troops, parachute units should be withdrawn to
prepare for future operations. With its mission
complete on September 17, the 503d PIR began to redeploy to
Port Moresby. By September 19, the entire regiment
closed back on its base camp.[153]
There were ten thousand Japanese troops in
the Lae-Salamaua area before the Allied assault.
According to captured Japanese war records, one thousand
Japanese troops died in the first few days of
fighting. Twenty-five hundred more died in the defense
of Lae and Salamaua. The remainder of the Japanese
troops withdrew northward along dense jungle trails, where
another 600 perished from illness and exhaustion. In a
postwar interview, the intelligence officer of the Japanese
Eight Army defending the Lae-Salamaua area said that the
503d PIR airborne operation at Nadzab had taken place where
the Japanese had thought the enemy would never attack.
The operation nearly cut in half the retreating elements of
the Japanese 51st Division. The seizure of Nadzab cut
off the escape route through the Markham Valley and
forced the remainder of the Japanese to withdraw over the
more difficult jungle terrain to the north of
Lae.[154]
The Allied operation against Lae was a total success.
It was a brilliant employment of all available sources of
firepower and maneuver. The coordination of the feint
against Salamaua, the amphibious assault east of Lae with
the airborne drop at Nadzab were excellent examples of joint
planning and operations. An additional benefit of the
Lae offensive was the capture of the Nadzab airstrip, which
gave Kenney another excellent forward base for attacks
further to the west and north. Nadzab soon became one
of the largest Fifth Air Force bases in New
Guinea.[155]
According to the Weapon System Evaluation Group's definition
for success, the Nadzab airborne operation was an
unqualified one. The air effort was an astounding
success because the combination of air support and accurate
execution of the jump were unprecedented. The degree
of air superiority, a fundamental prerequisite for a
successful parachute drop, attained was a major factor in
determining whether it occurred during daylight or hours of
darkness. The Fifth Air Force successes against the
Japanese Air Force ensured the control of the skies that
allowed the operation to occur during daylight hours making
it the first large-scale American parachute drop conducted
during hours of light. The daylight airborne
operations also allowed the Fifth Air Force to conduct an
extensive and accurate preparation of the objective
area. Although there were no Japanese in the Nadzab
area, few would have survived the intense preparation.
The daylight operation also facilitated the accurate drop of
the entire regiment, which was the most accurate one to
date.
The definition of success for the airborne effort was to
seize all of its objectives and held at the planned
time. Again, this was another remarkable
success. Within two hours, the paratroopers secured
all their assault objectives and within twenty-four hours,
the airstrip was operational, all according to the plan.
The definition for success for the overall effort was that
the airborne operation accomplished its planned purpose, and
the success of the overall maneuver, measured in terms of
the accomplishment of ultimate purpose, was dependent on the
performance on the airborne forces. Again, the overall
effort of the parachute drop was markedly successful.
The airborne operation allowed the 7th Australian Division
to seize Lae. Had it not been for the 503d PIR, that
division would have had to go over the rugged mountainous
terrain to get to Lae. This approach would have cost
it much in terms of time and combat power. And without
the 7th, the 9th Australian Division would not have been
able to capture Lae single-handedly. In addition to
seizing the Nadzab airstrip, the 503d PIR also blocked the
Markham Valley from any Japanese reinforcements or
escape.
The Nadzab airborne operation did not experience many of the
failures or poor employment principles that plagued earlier
parachute drops. Much of the doctrine for large-scale
airborne operations had not yet been written, so it is not
possible to evaluate the operation against doctrine.
In any case, the Nadzab parachute drop was well planned and
executed. The principles of mass, utilization as a
theater level force, realistic and thorough joint
rehearsals, and air superiority were all present. The
degree of air superiority allowed the mission to take place
during daylight hours, which probably contributed
substantially to the success of the air effort of the
airborne operation. The daylight parachute drop
allowed a precise placement of paratroopers not possible at
night that facilitated their quick assembly and seizure of
their objectives.
The Nadzab parachute drop had a decisive impact on the
deliberations of the so-called Swing Board, the special
panel chaired by General Joseph Swing to evaluate the
airborne operations in Sicily for the Chief of Staff of the
Army and recommend changes in training, doctrine and
employment principles. Indeed, the results of Nadzab
reported to Washington and Fort Bragg were welcome news in
sharp contrast to the operations in Sicily two months
earlier. Although the doctrine for large-scale
airborne operations was still in development during 1943,
the examples of Sicily and Nadzab provided valuable lessons
that would shape basic doctrine. The Sicilian
parachute drop showed airborne enthusiast how not to
conduct such an operation. Nadzab, on the other hand,
was an inspiring case study of how vertical envelopment
should be executed.
CHAPTER
6 - THE IMPACT OF
NADZAB
